Introduction
International events demonstrate how regional alliances are being formed to sculpt the new global order. In this context, the I2U2 cooperation group was established in 2022 by the United States of America, India, the United Arab Emirates, and the Zionist regime in order to jointly invest in the areas of transportation, water, energy, space, health, and food security. One of the covert objectives of this cooperation group’s formation was to normalize relations between the Arabs and the Zionist regime; the other covert objective is to fortify the sanctions policies against Iran by utilizing the resources of America’s strategic allies.
The Arab-Med project, also known as IMEC, aims to link Europe and India via the Persian Gulf nations.
The formation of the Arab-Med Corridor, which will link India through the Arab countries to the port of Haifa under the Zionist regime and then to Europe through the port of Piraeus in Greece, is one of the projects outlined in this group. Given the direct influence on Iran’s geopolitical position and interests, as well as India’s involvement in the development of Chabahar port, a strategic understanding of the I2U2 regional alliance and the recently defined Arab-Med corridor at the G20 summit is crucial.
India has been selected as the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign partner for the development of Chabahar port since 2015. However, to date, India has not taken any noteworthy steps in this regard and has instead provided the framework for the Iranian government’s transit embargo.
Figure 1: Using the Persian Gulf countries to connect India to Europe
By utilizing the long-standing relations between the Zionist regime and India and, on the other hand, by adopting the role of India’s procrastinator, this initiative aims to establish rail and road communication lines between the Zionist regime and the Arab countries, thereby speeding up and facilitating the process of normalizing relations between the Arabs and the Zionist regime. The development of Chabahar Port coincides with Iran’s transit embargo.
The North-South corridor initiative over the past 20 years and the announcement of the Iran-Rah initiative demonstrate that Iran has always been at the forefront of corridor initiatives in the region. However, this is what has prevented Iran’s corridor initiatives from securing a strategic position. that both internal and foreign factors, such as India’s justification for not finishing the Chabahar port, cause delays and interruptions in the implementation and operationalization of these projects. As a result, given the competing corridors’ plans and the countries’ current efforts to finish them, it is imperative that we reevaluate our interactions with foreign partners, carefully consider the developments in the area, and give our country’s corridor projects our full attention.
Policy suggestions
Iran should take into account the following things in light of the previously mentioned points:
India needs an operational response from Iran because it has expedited the normalization process and made Iran’s transit embargo easier by stepping over its red lines. This response cannot stay at the level of diplomatic compliments, given the significance of the matter. One of Iran’s most crucial responses to this Indian action will be to identify projects that go against India’s interests in the area. Considering the nature of India’s relations with China and Pakistan, one of the most crucial operational tools that can be pursued is coalition building and cooperative efforts with both nations, as well as the definition of cooperative security, political, and economic initiatives.
Another tactic Iran employs to deal with the Arab-fashion corridor is to use the power of regional and international actors whose interests run counter to their own. The regional alliance and the Arab-Mad Corridor directly conflict with those of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, China, and Russia, the latter two of which stand to lose the most politically and economically. Iran’s interests are overlapped with this. Together with Russia, Turkey and China can create a new front against this alliance by realizing the threat this alliance poses and how it will upset the balance of power in the region. In actuality, in spite of its potential for danger, the country has never had a better chance to define economic corridor projects with China and to strengthen ties between Iran and Turkey than the Arab-Med Corridor.
